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Abstract—In the near future, a technological revolution will
involve our cities, where a variety of smart services based on the
Internet of Things will be developed to facilitate the needs of the
citizens. Sensing devices are already being deployed in urban
environments, and they will generate huge amounts of data.
Such data are typically outsourced to some cloud storage because
this lowers capital and operating expenses and guarantees high
availability. However, cloud storage may have incentives to release
stored data to unauthorized entities. In this work we present
ABE-Cities, an encryption scheme for urban sensing which solves
the above problems while ensuring fine-grained access control on
data by means of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). Basically,
ABE-Cities encrypts data before storing it in the cloud and
provides users with keys able to decrypt only those portions
of data the user is authorized to access. In ABE-Cities, the
sensing devices perform only lightweight symmetric cryptography
operations, thus they can also be resource-constrained. ABE-
Cities provides planned expiration of keys, as well as their
unplanned revocation. We propose methods to make the key
revocation efficient, and we show by simulations the overall
efficiency of ABE-Cities.
Index Terms—Smart City, Urban Sensing, Attribute-Based
Encryption, Internet of Things, Data-Centric Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart cities offer digital services to facilitate the needs of
their citizens and improve their quality of life. Such services
span across all sectors of society including health, logistics,
and mobility. Services often capitalize on the Internet of
Things (IoT) as enabling technology. For example, cameras
could be deployed in the city so that citizens can monitor
traffic and detect possible congestions on the usual route
from home to work. In general, smart devices underlying
these services produce a large amount of data which can be
outsourced to a Cloud Storage Service (CSS). This is usually
preferred to an in-house solution because it reduces costs while
providing high availability.
In many cases, sensed data includes sensitive or valuable
information which is intended to be read only by a set of
authorized users. Unfortunately, as soon as data lands on the
cloud, we lose any control on it and we have to totally trust
the CSS. Cloud service providers may have some incentive to
release stored information to others [1], [2]. It follows that
the CSS is generally assumed honest-but-curious, meaning
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that it trustworthy carries out data distribution and elaboration
functions but is interested in accessing the resource contents.
A possible solution to this problem is to store an encrypted
version of the data on the CSS. An efficient way to do this
while ensuring fine-grained access control on data is to use the
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [3] technology. ABE allows
us to label a ciphertext with a set of attributes. A Trusted
Third Party (TTP) generates decryption keys and provides
them to users. Decryption keys embed an access policy over
the attributes, and they are capable of decrypting a ciphertext
only if the set of attributes labelling the ciphertext matches
the access policy.
In this paper we present ABE-Cities, an encryption system
for urban sensing in a smart city based on Attribute-Based
Encryption. ABE-Cities allows for fine-grained access control
over the encrypted data stored in the CSS, and it is secure
against multiple adversary models: a honest-but-curious cloud
service, external adversaries capable of eavesdropping traf-
fic and compromising sensing devices, and colluding users
wanting to gain more authorizations illegally. Sensing devices
perform only lightweight symmetric cryptography operations.
Therefore, ABE-Cities can employ also resource-constrained
sensing devices, which makes it suitable for a broader set of
IoT applications for smart cities. Our system also provides
mechanisms to enforce planned expiration of decryption keys,
as well as their unplanned revocation. We propose methods to
make the unplanned revocation efficient from the point of view
of the cloud service. We show by simulations the effectiveness
of such improvements.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II we compare
with related work. In Section III we introduce ABE and other
techniques that we use in our system. In Section IV we
describe ABE-Cities and our adversary models. In Section V
we focus on the access policies, whose structure is paramount
for the system performance. In Section VI we evaluate the per-
formance of ABE-Cities. Section VII summarizes our results
and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Yu et al. [4] first used ABE techniques for outsourcing
sensitive data to a honest-but-curious cloud storage, while
enforcing fine-grained access control at the same time. Their
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scheme is well applicable for example in ehealth, where
patients produce sensitive healthcare records and enjoy full
computational capabilities. However, it is less suitable for IoT
applications, in which data is produced by constrained device,
which could not have the necessary computational power
and energy to produce ABE ciphertexts. In our system, the
IoT devices execute only lightweight operations of symmetric
cryptography. The authors of [4] also proposed a technique
to delegate the burdensome re-encryption of old ciphertexts
to the cloud servers, in order to make a revoked key unable
to decrypt them. We use such a re-encryption technique as a
building block in our scheme.
Wang et al. [5] proposed a hierarchical ABE scheme that
allows the TTP to delegate part of the responsibility to
other authorities, which independently make decisions on the
semantics of their attributes. Hierarchical ABE allows also for
proxy re-encryption, but it forces the access policies to have a
fixed structure, so it limits the flexibility of the access control
system. In this paper, we focused on a non-hierarchical ABE
scheme with a single TTP, leaving the possible hierarchical
extensions as future work.
Yu et al. [6] proposed an ABE scheme to encrypt data
sensed by a wireless sensor network (WSN). The authors
used broadcast encryption in order to perform key revocations
efficiently. Although their system is suitable for a large set
of application scenarios involving locally distributed WSNs,
it could be unpractical for geographically distributed ones,
like those employed in a smart city. This is because an
actual broadcast is impossible in these scenarios. Moreover,
the authors propose to perform ABE encryption directly on
the sensing devices, which could not have the necessary
computational power and energy to do it. In our system,
we propose a key revocation method whose efficiency is
based on a convenient attribute representation of the smart
city. In addition, in our system the IoT devices execute only
lightweight operations of symmetric cryptography.
Yao et al. [7] proposed an ABE scheme based on elliptic
curves instead of pairings. This makes ABE operations more
lightweight and more suitable for typical IoT constrained de-
vices. In our scheme, the IoT devices execute only lightweight
operations of symmetric cryptography. This permits us to
use the pairing-based ABE scheme of Goyal et al. [3],
which allows us to employ advanced features like proxy re-
encryption [4].
Recently, Odelu et al. [8] proposed an ABE scheme suitable
for IoT scenarios because encryption and decryption times are
O(1). However, such scheme forces the access policies to have
a fixed structure, so it limits the flexibility of the access control
system. On the contrary, our system is based on Goyal’s ABE,
which offers a greater degree of expressiveness.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) is a
public-key encryption scheme based on bilinear pairings. It
was introduced by Goyal et al. [3] as an extension of the
original ABE proposed by Sahai and Waters [9]. In KP-ABE
everyone can encrypt because who encrypts uses only public
parameters. The ciphertexts are labelled with a set of attributes
which describes them (encryption attributes, γ). Decryption
keys embed an access policy (T ), and they are capable of
decrypting a ciphertext only if the encryption attributes on the
ciphertext match the policy. Who encrypts data is said a data
producer, whereas who holds a decryption key and decrypts
data is said a data consumer.
An access policy is a monotonic Boolean formula on
the presence of some attributes on the ciphertext. It can
be represented as a tree in which leaf nodes are attributes
(access policy attributes, λ), and non-leaf nodes are AND/OR
operators. For example, let us suppose that a data consumer
holds a decryption key embedding the access policy T =
(A ∧ (B ∨ C ∨ D)) (and thus, its access policy attributes
are λ = {A,B,C,D}). This access policy reads as follows:
“the attribute A must be present in the ciphertext, and one
of the attributes B, C, and D must be present as well.” A
ciphertext labelled, for example, with the encryption attributes
γ = {A,C,E} can be decrypted by the above decryption key.
Goyal’s KP-ABE does not allow for non-monotonic access
policies, i.e., Boolean formulas including NOT operators.
KP-ABE is resilient to collusion, meaning that two decryp-
tion keys cannot be combined somehow to decrypt a ciphertext
that they could not decrypt singly. The set of all the attributes
used in a given KP-ABE scheme is the universe of the
attributes (U) for such scheme. Without losing in generality,
in the following we will indicate an attribute in the universe
either with its unique name, or with a unique natural number
which is more convenient in formulas. The attribute sets U , γ,
and λ are thus subsets of N.
In order to ease the reading, we abstract away from this
paper the mathematical insight of the KP-ABE scheme. The
interested reader can refer to [3] for such details. We model
the KP-ABE scheme with the following black-box primitives.
1) (MK,PK) = Setup(U): This primitive initializes a
KP-ABE scheme. It takes as input the universe of the attributes
and generates a random master keyMK = (y, ti∈U ), which is
kept secret, and an associated set of public parameters PK =
(Y, Ti∈U ). Each attribute i in the universe is associated to a ti
and a Ti. The Setup primitive is executed by the TTP.
2) E = Encrypt(M,γ, Y, Ti∈γ): This primitive encrypts a
plaintext M with the encryption attributes γ. It takes as input
Y and Ti∈γ , which are all public parameters. It produces the
ciphertext E = (γ, e˜, ei∈γ). Each attribute i in the encryption
attribute set is associated to a ciphertext component ei. The
Encrypt primitive is executed by a data producer.
3) DK = KeyGen(MK, T ): This primitive generates a
new decryption key DK = (T , λ, dki∈λ), which is sent to
the data consumer in a confidential way. It takes as input
the master key and an access policy T , with access policy
attributes λ. Each attribute i in the access policy attribute set
is associated to a decryption key component dki. The KeyGen
primitive is executed by the TTP.
4) M = Decrypt(E,DK): This primitive decrypts the
ciphertext E given a decryption key DK. It produces the
plaintext M if the decryption key is able to decrypt the
ciphertext, ⊥ otherwise. The Decrypt primitive is executed
by a data consumer.
B. Proxy Re-Encryption
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a technique which allows
an entity, given an encrypted message, to produce the same
message encrypted with a different key, without accessing the
message itself. Yu et al. [4] introduced a PRE technique for the
KP-ABE scheme. By using this technique, one can re-encrypt
old ciphertexts in order to prevent a revoked key to decrypt
them and outsource this burdensome operation to a honest-
but-curious CSS without compromising data confidentiality.
Yu et al.’s PRE implements the revocation of a decryption
key by means of a system-wide update of a subset µ of its
access policy attributes (µ ⊆ λ). In particular, the subset µ is
such that, without those attributes in a ciphertext, the access
policy will surely not be satisfied. Updating an attribute i to a
new version simply means that all the relative cryptographic
quantities in the system are changed. Specifically, for all the
attributes i ∈ µ, the quantities ti, Ti, the ei’s of all the old
ciphertexts, and the dki’s of all the decryption keys except
those of the revoked key are updated with new quantities t′i,
T ′i , e
′
i, and dk
′
i. The burdensome computation of the updated
dk′i can be outsourced to the CSS as well. From now on, we
implicitly consider the quantities ti, Ti, ei, and dki always
accompanied by the information about their versions.
The computation of the e′i’s and the dk
′
i’s is delegated to a
honest-but-curious CSS. To do this, the TTP computes a re-
encryption key (rki) and sends it to the CSS, which can apply
it to an ei to obtain an e′i, and to a dki to obtain a dk
′
i. The
computation of the dk′i’s cannot be completely outsourced,
since the CSS would then know all the decryption keys, so it
could violate the data confidentiality. To avoid this, the CSS is
provided with all the decryption key components except those
relative to a special attribute (dummy attribute) which has no
meaning and is never updated to a new version. The dummy
attribute is ANDed at the root of the access policies of all the
decryption keys, and it is included as an encryption attribute
in all the ciphertexts. In this way, a decryption key cannot
decrypt anything without the component relative to the dummy
attribute, which is known only by the data consumer. Thus,
only the data consumer can effectively use his/her decryption
key.
Proxy re-encryption is performed in a lazy fashion (lazy
re-encryption), meaning that the CSS does not perform any
burdensome operation at the moment of the key revocation, but
only afterwards when needed. At the moment of revocation,
the TTP produces a re-encryption key for each attribute i in
µ and adds it to a re-encryption key history (RKHi) stored
in the CSS. RKHi is a list that keeps track of all the re-
encryption keys relative to the attribute i, one for each version
update of the attribute (rki, rk′i, rk
′′
i , . . . ). Only when a data
consumer asks the CSS for a ciphertext whose components
are outdated, then the CSS computes the new components. If
a ciphertext component was outdated of more than one version,
then the CSS will use more than one re-encryption key from
the history to update it. Similarly, if the consumer’s decryption
key has outdated components, then the CSS computes the
new components. If a decryption key component was outdated
of more than one version, then the CSS will use more than
one re-encryption key from the history to update it. Finally,
the CSS provides the data consumer with the ciphertext and,
possibly, with the new decryption key components. Note that
the new decryption key components can be transmitted to the
data consumer in the clear, without compromising the secrecy
of the key. Indeed, an adversary cannot use the decryption
key components unless she knows also the one relative to the
dummy attribute, which is never updated.
In order to ease the reading, we abstract away from this
paper the mathematical insight of the PRE scheme. The
interested reader can refer to [4] for such details. We model
the PRE scheme with the following black-box primitives.
1) (t′i, T
′
i , rki) = UpdateAttribute(i,MK): This prim-
itive updates the attribute i, meaning that it produces the
new quantities t′i, T
′
i , and the re-encryption key rki. The
UpdateAttribute primitive is executed by the TTP.
2) e′i = UpdateE(i, ei, RKHi): This primitive updates
a ciphertext component to a new version. The UpdateE
primitive is executed by the CSS.
3) dk′i = UpdateDK(i, dki, RKHi): This primitive up-
dates a decryption key component to a new version. The
UpdateDK primitive is executed by the CSS.
C. Segment Trees
A segment tree is a data structure that represents a set of
intervals [10]. It allows us to efficiently query which intervals
contain a given point. Segment trees are useful in ABE
schemes to implement efficient point-in-interval access poli-
cies [11]. Although segment trees can in principle represent
any point and interval in R, in this paper we focus on discrete
segment trees, i.e., segment trees that represent points and
intervals in Z. Specifically, we focus on discrete segment trees
capable of representing any point and any interval included in
a limited number range [1, ρ], with ρ ∈ N. In the following,
we will generically use the term “segment tree” to intend such
a type of discrete segment tree.
A segment tree over the range [1, ρ] is a binary tree in which
each number in [1, ρ] is relative to a leaf. For example, Fig.
1 shows a segment tree over the range [1, 7]. The leaf l1 is
relative to the number 1, the leaf l2 to the number 2, and so on.
A generic point ν in the range [1, ρ] is represented by a point
representation set RSν , which is formed by the nodes on the
path from the root to the leaf relative to the point. For example,
in the segment tree of Fig. 1, the point ν = 5 is represented by
the point representation set RSν = {n6, n5, n3, l5}. It can be
shown that every point representation set is O(log ρ) nodes.
On the other hand, a generic interval ι included in the range
is represented by an interval representation set RSι, which
is the minimum set of nodes whose descendant leaves form
l1 l2 l6l5l3 l4
n1 n2 n3
n4 n5
n6
l7
Fig. 1. Example of a segment tree. Grey nodes form the point representation
set of 5, dashed-border nodes form the interval representation set of [3, 7].
the interval. For example, in the segment tree of Fig. 1, the
interval ι = [3, 7] is represented by the interval representation
set RSι = {n2, n5}. It can be shown that every interval
representation set is O(log ρ) nodes. By construction, RSν
and RSι have non-empty intersection iff the point ν belongs
to the interval ι: ν ∈ ι⇔ RSν ∩RSι 6= ∅. For example, in the
segment tree of Fig. 1, the point ν = 5 belongs to the interval
ι = [3, 7] because RSν ∩RSι = {n5} 6= ∅.
Segment trees are useful in ABE schemes to implement
efficient point-in-interval access policies [11], i.e., access
policies which are satisfied iff a given point ν belongs to a
given interval ι. According to the terminology in [11], we
consider only “KP-ABE Type 1 construction”, which means
that the ciphertext embeds the point, and the access policy
embeds the interval. The point-in-interval access policy is thus
implemented in the following way. Each node of the segment
tree is represented by an ABE attribute. The ciphertext is
labelled with the attributes representing the nodes of the point
representation set RSν . The access policy is an OR operator
between the nodes representing the interval representation set
RSι. By construction, the access policy is satisfied iff RSν
and RSι have non-empty intersection, that is, iff ν is in ι.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In our system, a city is represented by a street network,
i.e., a graph in which the edges represent streets. Each street
is characterized by an identifier and is partitioned into road
segments. A sensing device is a possibly constrained device
placed on a road segment that acquires data (sensed data, SD)
relative to such a road segment. The sensed data is stored in
an encrypted form in a Cloud Storage Service (CSS), where
it is made read-only accessible to the users. The users are the
data consumers of our system.
A user can be authorized to access only data sensed from
some regions of the city, specified as a set of road segments.
For example, supposing the sensing devices to be cameras,
the user can monitor the traffic congestion on the route he/she
usually travels from home to work. To do this, the cameras
could store in the CSS many short video files to implement
an encrypted streaming service. The user can also monitor
multiple routes, in order to identify the least congested one
day by day. Moreover, some advanced-privilege users could
be provided, for example a transportation management service
which can monitor all the road segments of the city.
The architecture of our system is shown in Fig. 2.
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Users Sensing devices
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Fig. 2. System architecture.
In the following, we will give a general and intuitive descrip-
tion of the system while in Section IV-B we will describe
the system procedures in detail. The TTP holds the KP-
ABE master key and an RSA key which it uses to sign
messages. There is nothing special in choosing RSA as digital
signature algorithm, elliptic-curve digital signature algorithms
(EC-DSA) are suitable as well. The notation Sign(·) is used
to represent the TTP’s signature on something. The TTP also
shares with each sensing device j a long-term symmetric key
(K(j)LT ), which is supposed to be preloaded in the sensing
devices. Each sensing device holds also a data encryption
key (DEK(j)), which is the actual symmetric key used to
encrypt the sensed data. The data encryption key is frequently
renewed by the sensing device, once for each produced piece
of data. Each user u holds a KP-ABE decryption key DK(u),
and an RSA key RSA(u)priv which he/she uses to decrypt
messages received from the TTP. We denote by RSA(u)pub the
corresponding public key. The CSS maintains a database of
re-encryption key histories and decryption key components
to perform proxy re-encryption. In addition, it stores device
boot material, encrypted sensed data, and ABE-sealed keys.
The device boot material is needed by the sensing devices
to encrypt their data. The encrypted sensed data is the actual
data produced by the sensing devices and encrypted with a
symmetric encryption algorithm. The ABE-sealed keys are
necessary to decrypt the sensed data and are in turn encrypted
(sealed) with KP-ABE. The CSS stores an ABE-sealed key
for each sensing device and for each day of system operation.
To access a piece of sensed data, users must first decrypt the
corresponding ABE-sealed key and then decrypt the sensed
data.
The universe of the attributes U is logically divided into two
subsets: UR and UX . UR includes the attributes to represent
road segments. UX includes the attributes to represent time.
Each ABE-sealed key relative to the sensing device j is
labelled with the encryption attributes γ(j), which are logically
divided into two subsets: γ(j)R and γ
(j)
X . The attributes in γ
(j)
R
identify the device’s road segment, while the attributes in
γ
(j)
X identify the day in which data has been sensed (data
production date). Similarly, the access policy T embedded in
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I am authorized to access
Data has been produced within 
the validity period of my key
Fig. 3. Example of access policy for a user’s decryption key in our system.
In order to decrypt an ABE-sealed key, the user’s decryption key must satisfy
both the subtrees.
each decryption key is logically divided into two subtrees: TR
and TX (Fig. 3). The two subtrees are operands of an AND
operator (T = TR ∧ TX ), which is the root of the access
policy. The TR subtree identifies the road segments the user
is authorized to monitor (authorized road segments) while TX
specifies the validity period of the key. The validity period is
the period of time from the day the user joins the system to
the day in which his/her subscription ends. Hence, the user is
able to decrypt sensed data produced during his/her validity
period by sensing devices belonging to his/her authorized road
segments.
Note that, in order to implement proxy re-encryption, the
CSS is let know of all the re-encryption keys except those
relative to the attributes in UX , and all the decryption key
components except those relative to the TX subtree. The
presence of at least one attribute in UX is ANDed at the root
of the access policy of all the decryption keys. In practice, the
attributes in UX , which are never updated to a new version,
replace the dummy attribute of the Yu et al.’s PRE scheme [4].
A. Adversary Model(s) and Security Analysis
We consider three types of adversary: (i) the honest-but-
curious CSS, (ii) an external adversary capable of eavesdrop-
ping traffic and compromising sensing devices, and (iii) a set
of colluding users wanting to gain more authorizations ille-
gally. The CSS is assumed to be honest-but-curious, meaning
that it trustworthy carries out data distribution and elaboration
functions but is interested in reading the stored sensed data. To
decrypt the stored sensed data, the CSS should first decrypt the
ABE-sealed key, which is encrypted with KP-ABE. However,
the CSS does not know any complete decryption key to do this.
In particular, it knows none of the decryption key components
relative to the attributes in UX , whose presence is always
ANDed at the root of all the access policies.
The external adversary can eavesdrop all the traffic between
the entities of our system. Her goal is to read the sensed data.
To achieve this, she could either steal decryption keys, or inject
malicious device boot material to make the sensing devices
encrypt data with a compromised key. However, none of these
tactics are viable. Stealing decryption keys is infeasible since
the TTP sends them to newly joined users encrypted with
RSA. Injecting malicious device boot material to a sensing
device is infeasible too, since it is authenticated with the long-
term secret key shared between the device and the TTP. Even
if the external adversary compromises a sensing device, she
can only read the new sensed data produced by such device
after the compromise, but not the old one. Indeed, as we will
explain in detail in Section IV-B, each device changes the
data encryption key at each new piece of produced data. At
the moment of compromise, only the current data encryption
key is actually compromised. The old data encryption keys
are securely destroyed by the sensing device and are not
recoverable from the current one.
The third type of adversary is a set of users who collude to
gain more authorizations illegally. This is infeasible because
KP-ABE is resilient to collusion, meaning that two decryption
keys cannot be combined somehow to decrypt an ABE-sealed
key that they could not decrypt singly.
B. System Procedures
1) Setup Procedure: This procedure initializes the system.
The TTP defines the universe of the attributes U = UR∪UX
and then executes the Setup(U) primitive which produces the
master key and the public parameters. The TTP keeps the
master key secret and stores in the CSS an empty re-encryption
key history for each attribute in UR.
2) Key Distribution Procedure: This procedure provides a
user with a new decryption key. It is executed when a new
user joins the system, as well as when an old user needs to
renew his/her decryption key because it expired or it has been
compromised.
The TTP first defines the access policy of the new user u.
Which access policy assigning to each user depends strictly on
the application. Once the TTP defined the user’s access policy
T , it creates the user’s decryption key DK(u) by executing the
KeyGen(MK, T ) primitive. The TTP encrypts the message
(DK(u), cur.date,Sign(DK(u), cur.date)), where cur.date is
the current date, with the user’s public key and provides it to
the user either with a direct channel or through the CSS. The
user decrypts it and verifies the TTP signature to be valid,
and cur.date to be the actual current date. If everything is
correct, the user accepts DK(u) as his/her decryption key.
In the meanwhile, the TTP sends to the CSS the message
(u, dki∈λ(u)∩UR , cur.date,Sign(u, dki∈λ(u)∩UR , cur.date)),
where λ(u) are the access policy attributes of the user. The
CSS verifies the TTP signature to be valid, and cur.date to
be the actual current date. If everything is correct, the CSS
stores the decryption key components dki∈λ(u)∩UR .
3) Seal Procedure: This procedure is executed once a day
at the midnight.
For each sensing device j, the TTP generates a random
data encryption key DEK(j) and encrypts it with the
Encrypt(DEK(j), γ(j), PK) primitive. The result constitutes
the ABE-sealed key (ASK(j)) for the sensing device j, and
it is stored in the CSS. The CSS stores an ABE-sealed
key for each sensing device and for each day of system
operation. Also, for each sensing device j the TTP encrypts
with the long-term symmetric key K(j)LT the message
(DEK(j), cur.date,MAC
K
(j)
LT
(DEK(j), cur.date)), where
MAC
K
(j)
LT
(·) denotes a message authentication code keyed
by K(j)LT . The result constitutes the device boot material for
the sensing device j, and it is stored in the CSS too. The
CSS stores a device boot material for each sensing device.
Each sensing device retrieves its device boot material and
checks the MAC to be valid, and cur.date to be the actual
current date. If everything is correct, the device accepts
DEK(j) as its current data encryption key and initializes a
data encryption counter (c(j)) to zero.
4) Data Production Procedure: This procedure is executed
every time a sensing device produces a new piece of data.
First, the device encrypts the sensed data SD(j) with its
current data encryption key DEK(j). The result constitutes
an encrypted sensed data ESD(j), which is stored in the CSS
together with the current data encryption counter c(j). The CSS
stores many tuples (ESD(j), c(j)) for each sensing device.
Then, the sensing device computes a new data encryption key
as a one-way hash of the old one: DEK(j) ← H(DEK(j)).
Finally, the device securely destroys the old data encryption
key and increments its data encryption counter. This key
renewal method prevents an external adversary who physically
compromises a sensing device from decrypting old encrypted
sensed data, thus ensuring backward secrecy.
5) Data Consumption Procedure: This procedure is exe-
cuted every time a user wants to access a piece of sensed data.
The user u first sends a data request to the CSS specifying
which sensed data he/she wants to access. On receiving the
data request, the CSS checks whether some of the stored
decryption key components are out of date by comparing
their versions with the latest version of the relative attribute.
For each out-of-date component dki, the CSS updates it by
executing: dk′i = UpdateDK(i, dki, RKHi), and it provides
dk′i to the user. Then, the CSS checks whether some of the
ciphertext components of the ABE-sealed key ASK(j) relative
to the sensed data requested by the user are out of date. For
each out-of-date component ei, the CSS updates it by execut-
ing: e′i = UpdateE(i, ei, RKHi), and it replaces ei with the
updated version. Finally, the CSS provides the ABE-sealed key
ASK(j) and the tuple (ESD(j), c(j)) relative to the requested
data to the user. On receiving this, the user decrypts the
ABE-sealed key by executing the Decrypt(ASK(j), DK(u))
primitive. Of course, if the user is not authorized to access the
requested data, such primitive will return ⊥. Otherwise, the
user applies c(j) times the one-way hash H(·) on the result,
thus obtaining the data encryption key DEK(j) with which
the encrypted sensed data ESD(j) was encrypted. The user
can thus read the sensed data SD.
6) Key Revocation Procedure: Whenever a user u’s decryp-
tion key must be revoked, for example when his/her key is
compromised, the system makes it ineffective to decrypt any
ABE-sealed key by executing the key revocation procedure.
At first, the TTP determines the subset µ(u) ⊆ λ(u), i.e.,
a set of attributes without which the access policy will never
be satisfied. The TTP must update such attributes in order to
revoke the user u. In our system, the subset µ(u) is formed
by the attributes λ(u) ∩ UR. For each attribute i ∈ µ(u), the
TTP updates the related quantities by executing: (t′i, T
′
i , rki) =
UpdateAttribute(i,MK), and it replaces ti and Ti with
the updated versions. Then, the TTP sends the message
(u, rki,∀i∈µ(u) , cur.date,Sign(u, rki,∀i∈µ(u) , cur.date)) to the
CSS. The CSS verifies the TTP signature to be valid, and
cur.date to be the actual current date. If everything is correct,
the CSS adds each re-encryption key rki to the proper RKHi
and erases all the decryption key components dki∈λ(u)∩UR
related to the revoked user u. Finally, the TTP executes a seal
procedure. The user is now revoked, and his/her key is not
capable of decrypting any ABE-sealed key anymore.
V. UNIVERSE OF THE ATTRIBUTES AND ACCESS POLICIES
A. Road Segments Representation: Universe Subset UR
1) Basic Representation: The simplest representation con-
sists in mapping each road segment onto one attribute. In this
way, the γ(j)R set of each ABE-sealed key is formed by just one
attribute. On the other hand, the TR subtree of a decryption
key is an OR between many attributes, one for each road
segment the user is authorized to monitor. We will refer to
this implementation as the basic representation.
By using this representation, the number of attributes of the
key access policy, i.e., its key size, grows linearly with the
number of authorized road segments. When a user is revoked,
the attributes in the TR subtree of his/her key access policy
must be updated. The users whose decryption keys shared
any attribute, and thus any authorized road segment, with
the revoked key are called affected users. An affected user is
involved in the revocation process of another user, and his/her
key must be updated by the CSS during the data consumption
procedure, as explained in Section IV-B. Our aim is making
the key revocation more efficient by limiting the number of
affected users. This improvement lightens the load on the CSS
in terms of proxy re-encryption operations.
2) Segment Tree Representation: In the basic representa-
tion, it is very likely that two users share some road segments,
and, in this case, if one of them is revoked, the other will
be surely an affected user, thus generating a collision. For
example, a user authorized to monitor an entire street will
collide with any other user authorized to monitor any subset
of road segments of that street.
Segment trees, already used in ABE to reduce the key
size [11], can help us to reduce the average number of affected
users, too. For example, a user authorized to monitor an entire
street will not collide with another user authorized to monitor
only some road segments of that street. Let ρ be the number
of road segments of a generic street. We denote road segments
of that street with identifiers from 1 to ρ and build a segment
tree in which leaf nodes are the road segment identifiers. Each
node of the segment tree is represented by an ABE attribute.
The γ(j)R set of each ABE-sealed key is formed by a point
representation set and contains O(log ρ) attributes. Thus, the
TTP is required of a little more effort to produce the ABE-
sealed keys since the complexity of the Encrypt primitive
depends on the size of the encryption attribute set γ. On
the other hand, we use a point-in-interval access policy to
identify the subset of consecutive road segments of a street
which a user is authorized to monitor. The TR subtree of an
access policy is an OR between many point-in-interval access
policies, one for each street the user is authorized to monitor.
Fig. 4 shows a graphic example.
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Fig. 4. Example of TR subtree of the key access policy with segment tree
representation. The subtree s10 l5 ∨ s10 n2 is a point-in-interval access
policy of consecutive road segments of the street STREET10.
We will refer to this implementation as the segment tree
representation.
In addition to reduce the average number of affected users,
this representation reduces the key size if compared to the ba-
sic representation. Indeed, the size of an interval representation
set is always less than or equal to the number of represented
elements.
3) Attribute-Pool Representation: We introduce a third rep-
resentation which extends the segment tree representation to
further reduce the number of affected users due to a key
revocation. We replace each attribute i in the universe subset
UR of the segment tree representation with a pool of ε
attributes {iω}, with ω ∈ [1, ε] (replicas). Each replica iω
in the pool has the same meaning.
The γ(j)R set of each ABE-sealed key is formed by ε point
representation sets and contains O(ε log ρ) attributes. On the
other hand, the key size of a decryption key remains the same
of the segment tree representation. Indeed, the TR subtree of
a decryption key has the same structure of the segment tree
representation, but each attribute included in the TR subtree is
one among the ε replicas. We will refer to this implementation
as the attribute-pool representation.
To implement this representation, the TTP maintains a field
named numiω for each replica in UR, which represents the
number of non-revoked keys which are using that replica. The
field is initialized to zero. Its value is incremented when the
TTP issues a new decryption key whose access policy attribute
set contains the attribute iω . It is decreased in case of key
revocation. When the TTP executes the KeyGen primitive, for
each attribute which forms the TR subtree, it chooses the least
frequently used replica of the attribute, i.e., minω(numiω ).
This representation reduces the number of affected users due to
a key revocation. For example, two users who monitor exactly
the same road segments may share no attributes at all if they
have different replicas of each attribute in their decryption
keys. In such a case, if one of the two users is revoked, the
other will not be an affected user.
B. Time Representation: Universe Subset UX
In our system, the level of granularity of the time is one
day. We define the maximum system lifetime as the maximum
number of days of operation of the system. We represent the
days from 1 to the maximum system lifetime by means of a
segment tree. The γ(j)X set of each ABE-sealed key is formed
by the point representation set of the data production date.
On the other hand, the validity period of a decryption key is
obtained through a point-in-interval access policy, which forms
the TX subtree. Our system provides the planned expiration of
the decryption keys. When a decryption key expires, it is not
capable of decrypting new ABE-sealed keys anymore. From
the CSS point of view, key expiration is more lightweight
than key revocation because no proxy re-encryption is needed.
However, an expired key can still be used to decrypt past ABE-
sealed keys produced within the validity period of the key. If
we want to avoid this, we need instead to revoke the key.
Note that applying attribute-pool representation to the uni-
verse subset UX does not improve the performance of the
revocation since these attributes are never updated.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To test our scheme, we used a street network representing
the city of Pisa1 obtained from OpenStreetMap. We assumed a
maximum system lifetime of 100 years. Then, we considered
a dataset of 300 users with 365-day subscriptions. In our
simulation, every user subscribes to a route composed by
consecutive road segments. A route is characterized by a
length (route length, L), which is the line-of-sight distance
between its source point and its destination point. We chose a
source point at random within the map and a destination point
at random at a distance L from the source point. Within each
scenario we tested, we fixed a value for the route length which
is the same for all the users. We tested the system with route
lengths of 500m, 1000m, and 2000m. We used a KP-ABE
implementation written in C [12] which realizes the four KP-
ABE primitives described in Section III-A with 80-bit security.
In Fig. 5a we show a comparison between the average key
sizes for the three representations, with respect to the route
length. The lower part of the bars shows the portion of the key
size concerning the TX subtree. By using any representation, a
user’s device, e.g., a smartphone, can easily store a decryption
key of a few kilobytes. The CSS stores only the decryption
key components of the TR for all the users, and the total size
for our dataset of 300 keys is about 1.4MB using either the
segment tree or the attribute-pool representation with route
length of 2000m. The key size of the segment tree and the
attribute-pool representations are about a third compared to
the basic representation. Nevertheless, the key sizes are very
small and all the representations can be used from the point
of view of both the CSS and the user.
By using the same dataset, we revoked each user in turn
and measured how many other users were affected. In Fig. 5b
we show the average percentage of affected users by a single
revocation. As we expected, the segment tree and the attribute-
pool representations show less affected users than the basic
representation. This holds for all the values of the route length
tested. Fig. 5c shows the affected users with respect to the
number of alternatives in the attribute-pool representation. It
1Lat: 43.7052–43.7264, Lon: 10.3867–10.4266.
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Fig. 5. Performance evaluation. All the plots show 95% confidence intervals.
is evident from the figure that the affected users can be reduced
even further by increasing the parameter ε. The proposed
representations are capable to reduce the number of affected
users, and this lightens the load for the CSS due to a key
revocation, which is distributed over time thanks to the lazy
fashion of proxy re-encryption. The drawback is that the size
of the universe subset UR and the number of attributes of each
encryption attribute set γ grows with ε.
In our system, the load on the TTP is mainly determined by
the complexity of the Encrypt primitive, which grows linearly
with the cardinality of the encryption attribute set. The TTP
executes such primitive once a day for each device during
the seal procedure. We evaluated the computational load and
the required bandwidth on the TTP for the seal procedure.
We used the same street network representing the city of Pisa
and a maximum system lifetime of 100 years. We assumed
100 sensing devices deployed randomly on the street network.
We used the attribute-pool representation with ε = 5, which
represents the worst case in terms of encryption attributes, and
thus the worst case for the computational load and the required
bandwidth on the TTP. We define the key sealing time as the
time needed to generate all the ABE-sealed keys produced
during the daily seal procedure. We evaluated the key sealing
time on a desktop computer equipped with 16GB of RAM, an
Intel® Core™ i5-6600 CPU, and running Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS
64-bit operating system.
From our tests, the average cardinality of an encryption
attribute set γ is about 39, and γR is about 21. We observed
that the key sealing time was on average 5.4 seconds, and the
total size of the ABE-sealed keys was about 550KB. Hence,
the TTP is asked to carry out a task of a few seconds per day
and then send a few kilobytes of data to the CSS.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented ABE-Cities, an encryption system for urban
sensing in a smart city based on Attribute-Based Encryption.
ABE-Cities allows for fine-grained access control over the en-
crypted data stored in the CSS, and it is secure against multiple
adversary models. Sensing devices perform only lightweight
symmetric cryptography operations. Therefore, ABE-Cities
can employ also resource-constrained sensing devices, which
makes it suitable for a broader set of IoT applications for
smart cities. Our system also provides mechanisms to en-
force planned expiration of decryption keys, as well as their
unplanned revocation. We proposed methods to make the
unplanned revocation efficient from the point of view of the
cloud service. We showed by simulations the effectiveness of
such improvements.
REFERENCES
[1] S. D. C. Di Vimercati, S. Foresti, S. Jajodia, S. Paraboschi, and
P. Samarati, “Over-encryption: management of access control evolution
on outsourced data,” in Proceedings of the 33rd international conference
on Very large data bases. VLDB endowment, 2007, pp. 123–134.
[2] L. Coppolino, S. D’Antonio, G. Mazzeo, and L. Romano, “Cloud secu-
rity: Emerging threats and current solutions,” Computers & Electrical
Engineering, vol. 59, pp. 126–140, 2017.
[3] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryp-
tion for fine-grained access control of encrypted data,” in Proceedings
of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security.
ACM, 2006, pp. 89–98.
[4] S. Yu, C. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Achieving secure, scalable, and
fine-grained data access control in cloud computing,” in Infocom, 2010
proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–9.
[5] G. Wang, Q. Liu, and J. Wu, “Hierarchical attribute-based encryption for
fine-grained access control in cloud storage services,” in Proceedings of
the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security.
ACM, 2010, pp. 735–737.
[6] S. Yu, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “FDAC: Toward fine-grained distributed
data access control in wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 673–686, 2011.
[7] X. Yao, Z. Chen, and Y. Tian, “A lightweight attribute-based encryption
scheme for the internet of things,” Future Generation Computer Systems,
vol. 49, pp. 104–112, 2015.
[8] V. Odelu, A. K. Das, M. K. Khan, K.-K. R. Choo, and M. Jo, “Expressive
CP-ABE scheme for mobile devices in IoT satisfying constant-size keys
and ciphertexts,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 3273–3283, 2017.
[9] A. Sahai and B. Waters, “Fuzzy identity-based encryption,” in Annual
International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Crypto-
graphic Techniques. Springer, 2005, pp. 457–473.
[10] M. De Berg, M. Van Kreveld, M. Overmars, and O. C. Schwarzkopf,
“Segment trees,” in Computational geometry. Springer, 2000, pp. 231–
237.
[11] N. Attrapadung, G. Hanaoka, K. Ogawa, G. Ohtake, H. Watanabe,
and S. Yamada, “Attribute-based encryption for range attributes,” in
International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks.
Springer, 2016, pp. 42–61.
[12] Y. Zheng, “kpabe,” https://github.com/gustybear/kpabe, 2014.
